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11. Mobility patterns and career outcomes
This paper looks at the relationship between career path characteristics of Swedish civil
servants and their career success. From an extensive dataset containing around 75,000
Swedish administrators' careers we have detailed knowledge of where people worked,
when they changed organizations within government, and even when they changed to
employers in the private or non-commercial/non-governmental sectors. We use this
data to construct variables capturing characteristics of these administrators' past career
patterns|most importantly their mobility between organizations|and test these vari-
ables' explanatory power as to whether the observed individuals reach a position where
they are considered a senior government ocial (SGO), a status which we use as an
indicator of career success.
Exploring this relationship contributes to the comparatively scarce but growing empir-
ical literature on career paths within personnel economics. Understanding the existence
and functioning of internal labour markets, as rst characterized by Doeringer and Piore
(1971), has recently received considerable academic attention and advancement thanks
to studies by Lazear and Oyer (2004a,b) for example, who characterize rm-internal and
external job mobility in the Swedish private sector. The paper at hand is among the rst
to explicitly focus on a public sector setting, and it is also the rst to use high-quality
and comprehensive Swedish data following a large number of individuals over several
years through public as well as private sector employment. It therefore contributes to
understanding empirically how people pursue careers within and between organizations,
and it does so for a sector that in some developed countries accounts for nearly 30% of
total employment (OECD 2008: 13).
Moreover, there are two theory-driven motivations for this research. First, personnel
economics has identied a number of mechanisms which could imply that early-phase
career patterns are correlated with (or `predict') later career success. At one end, there
are those based on experience or human capital acquisition. They contend that the
early phases in someone's career serve as preparation and training for later manage-
ment challenges, e.g. due to gaining experience on the job (Jovanovic and Nyarko 1997;
Gibbons and Waldman 1999)1 or special internal training (Demougin and Siow 1994).
At the other end there are informational arguments based on ability signalling, which
may work through various types of signals such as early career speed (Bernhard 1995),
self-sorting or \screening" (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976), and engaging in other costly
activities to credibly signal ambition, commitment to the job, and management suitabil-
1 An empirical reference on this particular point is van den Berg, Holm and van Ours (2002).
2ity. Job mobility or intra-governmental \department hopping", that we investigate in
this paper, can be an indicator of either types of theories.2 Therefore, we also present
some additional evidence on why early career patterns predict future success in an eort
to pin down the mechanism is at work.
The second theoretical motivation for this research concerns employees' incentives
how to choose their career paths. Indeed, it can be argued that nding a strong link
between career patterns today and career success tomorrow may be bad news. In the
context of this paper the basic argument goes as follows: If it is the case that in the
Swedish administration more mobile employees are more successful, then it is likely
that young recruits (implicitly or explicitly) understand this relationship. Those who
are very motivated and eager to reach a high-level position will then be tempted to
undertake job changes merely as opportunistic \careering activities". This need not be
harmful, but it may well be, as the analysis in Br osamle (2010) suggests. It certainly
is if individual career incentives lead to above-optimum mobility which then interferes
with people's optimal skill development. Excessive rotation is also a problem if it leads
to an inecient allocation of talent. Indeed, herein lies one of the main reasons for
why studying signalling eects from career patterns may be particularly relevant in a
public sector setting. As is widely acknowledged, in the typical public sector setting|
and arguably also `bureaucratic' parts of companies|performance is harder to measure
precisely (see e.g. Dixit 2002). This implies that explicit benets are usually lower-
powered, which one generally observes, and it also opens the door for stronger signalling
through potentially informative clues about employee valence.
Our results speak a fairly clear language. We nd solid evidence that intra-governmental
job mobility and interchanges between the government and other sectors|the so called
`revolving doors'|are relevant and reliable predictors of people's career success. This
holds using a range of dierent estimation techniques and model specications. Although
the nature of the data does not allow us to rule out completely that the results are par-
tially driven by people's unobserved characteristics, such as innate ability or leadership
suitability, several robustness checks suggest that the association may be causal.3
Keeping the caveat concerning causality in mind, we nally try to dierentiate be-
2 A third possible explanation is that mobility extends one's professional network and thereby enhances
information about opportunities for advancing (see e.g. Calv o-Armengol and Jackson 2004), or even
access to such opportunities directly. While it would be possible to test for networks eect directly
using the data at hand, this must be left for future research due to the fundamentally dierent
methodologies involved.
3 Eliminating unobserved heterogeneity is not possible mainly because the data dictates to focus on the
one-time incident of reaching SGO status at some point, which makes any panel techniques exploiting
`within variation' obsolete.
3tween the mechanisms that may lead to job mobility aecting overall career success.
Specically, we try to discriminate between the mentioned informational mechanisms
such as ability signalling, and experience or skill acquisition mechanisms. Using a test
related to those employed by DeVaro and Waldman (2007) and Belzil and Bognanno
(2004), the evidence presented in this paper suggests that the link between changing
organizational unit within government and success may be driven by ability signalling
rather than experience gaining.
Related literature
There is little quantitative empirical literature on career patterns of public employees
and we know of only one which relates career patterns to the likelihood of success.4
More commonly addressed are questions of how success in the public sector relates to
educational background (e.g. Bowman and Mehay 2002), social background (e.g. Hart-
mann 2002), or gender issues (Pema and Mehay 2010). These studies are important but
only of limited relevance to our work. We try to solely focus on explanatory factors that
emerge after someone has started a career in government. We thus want to control for
everything that studies like the afore-mentioned ones have very legitimately put their
main focus on.
As far as careers and paths to higher oce are concerned, the political and administra-
tive science literature has produced a number of qualitative studies. The bibliographic
approach to careers in the British civil service by Theakston is a good example (1987;
1995). European comparative perspectives on \rewards at the top" are oered by Hood
and Peters (1994), and on bureaucratic elites more generally in Page and Wright (1999),
which also contains a very informative chapter on Sweden by Pierre and Ehn (1999).
Noteworthy is also Heclo and Madsen's (1987) work on policy making in Sweden more
generally.
More quantitative studies on careers and promotions inside organizations have mainly
been undertaken by personnel and other economists. All of these studies, except for the
analysis of a public university by Haeck and Verboven (2011), are based on private sector
data, which underpins our public sector study's uniqueness. The communality of all these
papers is that they draw on Doeringer and Piore's notion of \internal labour markets",
according to which individuals have careers within a set of governed career rules, rather
than \competing in a series of spot markets" (1971: 882). It is a conception of corporate
organizations that lends itself well to the analysis of classic civil service systems. The
4 It is Haeck and Verboven (2011) discussed below.
4key studies that we know of shall be discussed very briey.
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) present a comprehensive account of careers inside
a medium-sized US nancial service rm. While their approach is largely descriptive,
they were among the very rst to expose the internal labour market notion to a reality
check. Focussing on Doeringer and Piore's predictions on wages and pay, they nd
several characteristics of the internal labour market but their main conclusion is that no
one theory of wages and promotion can explain all the phenomena that they observe.
Seltzer and Merrett (2000) investigate historic personnel data from the Union Bank
in Australia. The career institutions at the time are reported to exhibit quite a few
characteristics of civil service systems, such as a clear rank structure, impersonal rules
for pay and promotion, a shielded internal labour market, and high rewards for long-
term tenure within the rm. However, as the authors point out, their paper is more
a long-term case study so that results are hard to generalize (577). Similar to that of
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom, their main conclusion is that no one theory can explain all
of the encountered career patterns and personnel management institutions. A paper by
Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello (1999) is mainly interested in the dilemma of selecting future
leaders early (and giving them special treatment compared to less promising employees)
versus preserving cohorts and selecting leaders much later. Based on career data from
a Japanese manufacturing rm the paper nds evidence for promotion fast tracks even
after controlling for time invariant ability. Human capital accumulation eects might be
a possible explanation for this, as the authors suggest.
Lazear and Oyer (2004a,b) analyze job mobility within and between Swedish rms
to show that mobility patterns clearly hint at the general co-existence of internal and
external labour markets. They nd that larger Swedish rms (with at least six or
seven dierent levels of job types) hire internally and externally to ll vacancies at all
of these job levels. The authors also nd that wages are inuenced substantially by
external factors, clearly rejecting the hypothesis of internal labour markets in private
sector companies providing eective protection from external wage pressures.
One of few public sector studies is Haeck and Verboven (2011), who study promotion
to dierent professor-level positions in a Belgian university. They argue that a high
early-phase career speed implying greater promotion chances is consistent with learning
theories working through a signalling eect, whereas a slow initial career speed predicting
greater promotion chances would hint at a human capital acquisition `story'. They
nd evidence for fast tracks and thus give the former explanation precedence over skill
acquisition. They also show, though, that the fast track eect weakens when performance
(publications, citations, and teaching load) is controlled for. The authors do, however,
5focus on promotion probabilities by hierarchical level without analysing the long run
relationship between early mobility and later success, which is the focus of this paper.
Belzil and Bognanno (2008, 2004) test a number of hypotheses concerning pay using
data of mid and top-level executives from over 380 U.S. rms. First, they conrm the
commonly hypothesized convexity of pay structures. Second, they also estimate how
past career patters aect current chances of promotions using a model that accounts for
a variety of individual-specic, rm-specic and other factors. Among other things they
nd modest fast track eects for some types of individuals. As will detailed below, they
seek to discriminate between the channel through which fast tracks operate: signalling
or skill acquisition. They conclude that it is most likely signalling because less educated
and newly recruited employees experience stronger fast track eects.
Our paper speaks to very similar questions, including trying to discriminate between
signalling and skill acquisition eects. The main dierences between many of the afore-
mentioned and our study is of course that we analyze a public sector setting with a
dataset of previously unknown size and power, that we focus on mobility between `rms',
and that we take overall career success as the outcome of interest|a choice that is
largely dictated by the nature of our data (becoming a senior government ocial is not
a repeated event).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some back-
ground information on the institutional environment of the Swedish civil service and typ-
ical career paths therein. Section 3 describes the data and presents descriptive statistics
to make some rst inferences about the mobility patterns within the Swedish adminis-
tration. The methodology and the main regression results are presented in Section 4,
which also summarizes the results of robustness checks. Section 5 aims to discriminate
between possible mechanisms driving the results before the last section concludes.
2. The Swedish administration
Institutional environment
In this section we summarize the picture emerging from existing, mostly qualitative,
studies of the Swedish civil service. The Swedish civil service is in charge of administering
what is often claimed to be the role model of a modern welfare state|one of the largest
in the world in terms of employees per population and budget per GDP. The public
administration literature, for example Peters (1995: 145), claims that for this reason
good management and competence among its sta have always been a matter of high
importance in Sweden|and of great interest by researchers all across the world|, and
6that Swedish civil servants generally enjoy high prestige. Traditionally, they operated
according to the Weberian principles of legality, impartiality, and legal security, which
in recent years however increasingly faced challenges from the eciency agenda of New
Public Management (NPM) reforms and the fact that the Swedish bureaucracy is viewed
to be an agent for social change (Pierre and Ehn 1999: 250).5
Regarding civil servants' careers, two characteristics of the Swedish state are partic-
ularly noteworthy. The rst is the importance of local government autonomy alongside
the existence of a centralized unitary state. The regional administration (l ansstyrelser)
carries out much of the cross-sectoral policy implementation and oversight functions of
central government policy at the local level (Pierre 1995: 141). This, it is argued, makes
employees of peripheral government bodies well-equipped to continue their career in cen-
tral government. The second is the relatively low level of discretion that politicians have
over the civil service. Pierre remarks that the Swedish bureaucracy is one among the
most autonomous of all Western states (151). Policy planning and implementation are
separated: the former carried out by the departments (departement), the latter by the
agencies ( ambetsverk).
The Swedish civil service system can be described as meritocratic with purely quali-
cation-based recruitment; promotion is mainly based on expertise and tenure. Political
inuence over stang and appointees are not very common and if so only at the very
top levels. In the ministries only the minister and his or her advisors (sakkunniga) are
actual appointees. The administrative heads of ministries (for whom labels dier across
countries, in Sweden statssekreterare) are often also considered political appointments
because there is substantial political inuence over their stang even though they are
regularly recruited from the civil service. But any such inuence is absent only one level
below. In agencies it is often only the head of the agency (generaldirekt or) who is de
facto politically appointed (Pierre 1995: 143), and even here most are recruited from
the civil service.6
The most striking characteristic of personnel management in the Swedish civil service
is probably its decentralized nature. It leaves great freedom for individual organizations
to advertise jobs and hire their own personnel. This freedom is limited and governed by
regulation specifying the requirements of suitable candidates (Peters 1995: 146). The
Swedish Civil Service is a generalist service nevertheless, especially at higher levels. In
5 For a critical view on `the fall of the strong state' see Lindvall and Rothstein (2006).
6 There seems to be some disagreement over the degree of political inuence in agency head stang
decisions. Sj olund (1994: 127) states that between 1976 and 1982, less than a quarter of all agency
heads had a private sector or political background. On the other hand, Pierre and Ehn (1999: 252)
argue that they are de facto political appointees (although merit criteria have to be met).
7principle lawyers, political scientists, and economists|to name the three most recruited
elds of study|all have the same careers. Interestingly though, this does not imply
that there is vivid interchange and movement between ministries and agencies. For the
agencies this is mainly due to the specialist character of the work. Interchange between
ministries is reported to be somewhat higher, but remains low even after two reforms
(in 1984 and 1997) seeking to change this (Pierre and Ehn 1999).
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Research question and study design
In this paper we seek to investigate how inter-organizational job mobility relates to career
success in the Swedish administration. Specically, we ask how `department hopping'|
that is, changes from one organization within the Swedish government to another|earlier
in someone's career are associated with, or maybe even aect the chances of him or her
becoming a senior government ocial (SGO). We ask the same question for `revolving
doors'|that is, interchanges between government and the private and non-governmental
sectors. The theoretical motivations for doing so were discussed above and both, those
based on human capital acquisition and those based on ability signalling or sorting, make
us expect a positive relationship between past mobility and the chances of becoming an
SGO. We study this link primarily by running Cox duration or hazard analyses of the
`risk' of entering the status of SGO using an extensive dataset on Swedish civil servants'
careers. We turn to describing the dataset now.
3.2. Data and descriptive statistics
3.2.1. Data
The raw dataset covers the career histories of every individual that ever worked for the
Swedish government administration between 1985 and 2008. It is primarily drawn from
the Structure of Earnings Statistics (SES), which is an annual survey covering every
employee in all parts of government. From this the initial selection of our population of
interest is based on Swedish industry codes (SNI/NACE), which allow us to identify the
central government administration including its many agencies, but excluding armed
forces, regional governments, and specic delivery sectors such as health care, educa-
tion, environmental programmes, and support activities where we would expect career
patterns to be substantially dierent from the core of executive government. The SES
data only covers spells of employment in government. We therefore balance the panel
8by lling periods of temporary employment outside government and periods before or
after working in government with data from the Register Based Labour Market Statistics
(RAMS), which is an economy-wide database of tax records and other individual-specic
information. This allows us to start out with data on the careers of around 75,000 indi-
viduals over 24 years, containing around 1.5 million observations with a high degree of
detail during periods of government employment and somewhat less information during
periods of employment elsewhere, but it remains well sucient to follow individuals' job
mobility patterns.
The nally analyzed sample is obtained by imposing further restrictions. We take the
stock sample of everyone working in the Swedish administration in either 1995, 1996, or
1997. The window of sampling is chosen in the middle of our observation period to have
information about the past career going back at least ten years. This also enables us
to be suciently precise when excluding everyone who becomes an SGO already before
1995, which we have to do because we treat the event of attaining SGO-status as an
`absorbing state'. (We are mainly interested in whether someone makes it to the top at
all. Regaining an SGO position after having left one for a short while is surely driven
by factors that are very dierent from those relevant during the run-up to the rst one.
Our model specication would therefore hardly be appropriate to explain multiple spells
by the same individual.) We stock sample on three years to avoid missing mothers on
maternity leave and other temporary leavers. Finally, we restrict the sample by dropping
individuals with less education than upper secondary schooling.7 By doing so we only
lose a handful of individuals who eventually become senior ocials but presumably avoid
a lot of `noise' from the careers of the rank and le and other support workers (which
we are not focussing on). In the end, we run most of our estimations using information
from over one million observations from over 44 thousand individuals.8
Main event of interest: becoming a senior government ocial
The event that we are mainly interested in (which will be the `failure event' in the
hazard model and the dependent variable in the logit specications) is the incident of
someone reaching a high-ranking position in the Swedish Government for the rst time.
Specically, we take the incident of an individual being classied as `Legislator or Senior
7 While we are indeed primarily interested in careers of the administrative elite, we clearly have to
retain individuals without university degrees because due to Pierre and Ehn (1999: 259) only around
90% of all senior civil servants held university degrees when they wrote their study.
8 Note that the regression tables presented below report around 575,000 observations or less. The
gure is well below one million because the information from the rst ten periods of each individual
is summarized in the career history variables of other observations. This will become clearer below.
9Government Ocial' by the Swedish Standard Classication of Occupations (SSYK)9
as our main event of interest, which is captured by the variable Ssyk111, which takes
the value one if someone has an SSYK-code of 111x and zero otherwise. This classi-
cation primarily contains people titled departementsr ad (assistant under-secretary) and
generaldirekt or (director general). Much more rarely also ambassad or (ambassador),
ambassadr ad (counsellor), l ansr ad (county director), r attschef (`legal supervisor'), and
sakkunnig (special advisor). While the classmark in general also contains a number of
positions that are more political than administrative in nature, we ensure that our nal
sample is free of most of those cases. For example, cabinet ministers (statsr ad) also
have a SSYK-code starting with 111, but virtually none of them has previous public
sector employment so that they are not selected in our stock sampling on the 1995{
1997 interval with all `early failures' being excluded. Moreover, most of the relatively
few statssekreterare (state secretaries) and politiskt sakkuniga (political advisors) among
the SGOs may also be considered at least semi-political appointments. Interestingly,
when we manually checked a small representative selection we found that nearly all of
them are recruited from within the civil service. So they are in our sample and we
cannot eliminate them,10 but we contend that their success may be viewed as success in
administration|in which organization are there no \politics"|so that we accept these
few cases to remain. Indeed, this practice nds further support by the fact that the
denition of the Swedish bureaucratic elite developed by Pierre and Ehn (1999) also
contains statssekreterare.11 All other categories they include coincide very well with the
SSYK-classication, namely assistant under-secretaries (departmentsr ad), and for the
agencies director generals (generaldirekt or), and the section managers (avdelningschef).
So all in all, the group marked by the dummy Ssyk111 is similar although somewhat
more lavish than the denition of the Swedish administrative elite which is the best-
established one in the public administration literature. The precise numbers will be
discussed below, just note for now that the identied group entails less than 1% of the
sampled individuals.
A technical diculty arises because in the original data the SSYK-codes are only
available from 1995 onwards. For 1985 to 1995 (inclusive) there exist an older and in
fact more detailed job classication (tj anstekod). We exploit the overlapping year 1995
9 It coincides with the International Standard Classication of Occupations (ISCO-88) coding scheme.
10 This is because we only have detailed position labels, so called tj anstekods, up to 1995.
11 However, Pierre and Ehn (1999) admit they do this primarily to have their bureaucratic elite com-
prised of two rank levels rather than just one (251). Senior ministers, of which there exists one per
ministry, and associate ministers (bitr adande minister) are clearly political positions and are not part
of our denition.
10to construct the SSYK-codes for the period prior to 1995. While not every tj anstekod-
SSYK combination occurs in 1995 for a perfect reconstruction to be possible, we nd
unambiguous matches for 92% of the tj anstekods occurring between 1985 and 1994.
Of course, the sample restrictions discussed above imply that no reconstructed case of
Ssyk111=1 ends up being one of our `failing' individual, but the pre-construction is
nevertheless crucial to identify and drop individuals who obtain SGO-status.
Other events of interest: entry into the Civil Service and into middle management
Before becoming an SGO there are two other events of interest: 1) entering into govern-
ment employment for the rst time, and 2) becoming a middle manager in the Swedish
government.
The latter event is straight forward to dene because in the data it is recorded as an
SSYK classication of 1xxx.12 The former incident, entry into public employment, is
less easy to determine because the data is truncated. Just under half of the individu-
als we observe are employed by government already in 1985 so that we cannot be sure
when they actually started working there. To gauge the severity of this left-truncation
problem, we classify a spell as truncated if the individual is employed in the government
administration in either 1985, 86, or 87. Thereby, we only falsely label as non-truncated
individuals who work outside government for more than three consecutive years. De-
scriptive statistics (similar to those discussed next) dierentiating by truncated and
non-truncated spells are available on request. More importantly, we later use the trun-
cation classication to run a robustness check based on a smaller sample of pure civil
service entrants.
Descriptive statistics by later success
Table 1 reports a number of sample summary statistics at the three career stages that
individuals can go through: rst entry into government employment; second, holding
a middle management position for the rst time; and third becoming an SGO for the
rst time. For each of those career stages it gives summary statistics for the full sample,
and then for individuals that later become SGOs versus those that do not. Already
here important insights into the mobility patterns of Swedish administrators and how
they may relate to later success can be won. The gures also reveal information about
internal and external management recruitment patterns. Note that Table 1 contains
12 Note that this denition obviously includes all incidents of people going straight from no management
status into a senior position. But the problem is minor: only 181 out of the 3,489 middle managers
are in fact senior government ocials straight away.
11summary statistic including individuals with truncated spells. But to assure sceptical
readers upfront, we deal with this problem in Section 4.3 where it is shown that our core
results hold up when using a sample of restrictively dened entrants.
In Table 1 the rst and second lines of numbers give a feel for the sample sizes: only
7.85% of all civil servants ever enter middle management, and only 0.73% ever become
SGOs (325 in absolute numbers). Nearly 65% of later SGOs are male, while only about
44% of all civil service entrants are male. Interestingly, this divide already occurs at
the middle management level where the overall share of males is 66%. While the gures
on age bear no surprises, one should note that the highest educational attainments of
later SGOs dier substantially from those of non-SGOs. As one would expect, at the
entry stage the two lowest educational levels are represented with around 47% and 7%,
respectively, while among SGOs these shares drop to 5% and around 2%, respectively.
The reverse trend applies to higher academic qualications, which only 45% of entrants
hold (summing both gures), while nearly 94% of all SGOs have higher academic qual-
ications.
The gures on the sectors that people worked in during the period prior to reaching
the three dierent career stages yield insights into recruitment patterns. Focussing on
the aggregate gures of middle and senior managers in columns (4) and (7), one can
see that recruitment straight from the private sector is rare at all public management
levels (2.52% and 1.23%, respectively). It is more common to move from other non-
administrative but also non-commercial sectors, such as NGOs, interest groups, local
government, and the like. Nearly 14% of all middle managers come directly from there,
but only just over 5% of SGOs. The rule seems to be that managers are recruited from
within the core administration, which applies to 73% of middle managers and even 80%
of SGOs.
The mobility patterns prior to becoming a middle or top-level manager (bottom two
lines of the table) reveal that around a fth to a quarter of managers `revolve' into
their rst management job from a non-administrative position.13 The share of people
changing organization within the administration immediately before taking their rst
mid or top-level management position is fairly low, with 5.82% and 9.23%, respectively.
Columns (5) and (6) reveal that later SGOs seem to be much more mobile already when
reaching the lower hierarchical ladders. Revolutions from outside the administration, but
also internal changes into the rst middle management job, are both much higher for
13 Note that this includes years of no recorded employment, which is why the gures in `Revolved into
current Position' are usually higher than the sum of `Worked in Private Sector' and `Worked in Other
Sector'.
12later SGOs than for others (37.85% versus 22.99% and 10.46% versus 5.34%). Looking
at the bottom two lines in columns (4) and (7) of Table 1 shows that averaged across the
whole government administration, organizations recruit about 70% of the middle and
top managers internally, while around 30% come from other government organizations
or even another sector. These shares dier by management level: Revolutions from the
non-administrative sector is higher for middle managers (24.39%) than for senior ocials
(20%).
All this suggests that, on the one hand, organizations in the Swedish government
administration have internal labour markets. On the other hand, there is also a sub-
stantial amount of external mobility, suggesting that the system is best characterized as
a permeable internal labour market. The descriptive statistics also reveals that mobility
patterns clearly dier systematically with people's later success. It is this aspect that
we focus our further attention on.
As a rst step, a brief look at Table 2 is worthwhile. Here, we report the number of
years that individuals with non-truncated spells have worked in dierent sectors when
entering the three career stages. The columns now dierentiate the gures by whether
individuals one day become SGOs or not. The main insight here is that already when
entering the middle management level the composition of work experience of later SGOs
diers from that of later non-SGOs. As can be seen in columns (5) and (6), when becom-
ing middle managers later SGOs are less likely to have had private sector experience and
more likely to have had non-administrative work experience than individuals who do not
become SGOs in the future. Even more interesting, they reach mid-level management
positions with, on average, less administrative work experience than their less successful
peers. This may be due to SGOs having faster careers from early on, which is further
supported by the fact that they enter middle management earlier.14
It can also be seen that there are dierences between later SGOs and later non-SGOs in
terms of the number of mobility incidents they exhibit when becoming middle managers.
Later SGOs have changed organization within government on average 0.5 times compared
to later non-SGOs with only 0.33. Similarly, they revolve into government from other
sectors 1.59 times compared to only 1.24 times of later non-SGOs. Also these dierences
will be subject to further scrutiny below.
14 This is consistent with fast tracks, such as in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994).
13Table 1: Individual characteristics at dierent career stages (by later success)
Stats for Individuals entering First Gov Employment First Middle Mmnt Position (ssyk1) SGO (ssyk111)
Full Sample Later SGO Later no SGO Full Sample Later SGO Later no SGO Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample Information
Number of Individuals 44,444 325 44,119 3,487 325 3,162 325
Share of 1st-Time Gov Employees 100 100 100 7.85 100 7.17 .731
Number of Observations 1,021,331 5,166 1,016,165 78,542 5,166 73,376 5,166
Individual Characteristics
Male (share) 44.1 64.6 44 66 64.6 66.2 64.6
Immigrant (share) 7.92 6.15 7.93 5.53 6.15 5.47 6.15
Age (Mean) 37.1 39.2 37 48.2 46.5 48.4 50.2
Age (Min) 18 23 18 26 26 26 26
Age (Max) 64 57 64 64 64 64 64
Highest Education (shares)
Edu Upper Secondary 46.8 4.92 47.2 10.1 4.92 10.6 4.92
Edu Short Tertiary 6.98 2.15 7.01 4.7 2.15 4.97 2.15
Edu Long Tertiary 43.6 80.3 43.4 78.2 80.3 78 80.3
Edu Postgrad or PhD 2.55 12.6 2.48 7 12.6 6.42 12.6
Sector in Previous Period (shares)*
Worked in Administration 0.00 0.00 0.00 73.57 59.54 75.03 80.00
Worked in Private Sector 14.18 5.96 14.26 2.52 1.97 2.58 1.23
Worked in Other Sector 20.07 44.92 19.89 13.79 15.38 13.63 5.23
Worked in Middle Management n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 32.92
Mobility Incident Prev Period (shrs)
Revolved into current Position 51.31 67.08 51.20 24.38 37.85 22.99 20.00
Intra-Gov Change into current Position n/a n/a n/a 5.82 10.46 5.34 9.23
*) Note that the rst three lines of this part of the table do not sum up to 100% because of truncated spells and individuals being in spells of no employment.
1
4Table 2: Career characteristics (cumulative over current and previous 10 years) at dierent career stages (by later success,
only non-truncated)
Stats for Individuals entering 1st Gov Employment 1st Middle Mmnt Position (ssyk1) SGO (ssyk111)
All Non-Trunc Later Later All Non-Trunc Later Later All Non-Trunc
Individuals SGO no SGO Individuals SGO no SGO Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Time Worked in Dierent Sectors
Years Worked in Administration 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 7.43 6.10 7.67 6.81
Years Worked in Private Sector 2.19 1.14 2.20 0.65 0.47 0.68 0.39
Years Worked in Other Employment 2.71 5.95 2.68 1.69 2.65 1.53 2.36
Years Worked in Middle Mmnt 0.01** 0.24** 0.01** 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 2.55
Cumulative Incidents of Mobility
Number of Intra-Gov Changes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.50 0.33 0.52
Number of Revolutions from Other Sectors 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.29 1.59 1.24 1.51
*) Figures are measured end of period, thus they are all one.
**) These very low shares arise from those few entrants who start as a middle managers right away.
***) Revolve also counts the rst incident of entering government employment.
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54. Method and results
4.1. Methodology of multivariate analysis
The brief overview of descriptive statistics shows that it is worthwhile taking a closer
look at earlier career patterns and later career success. To do so, we employ multivariate
duration or hazard models to control for as many as possible confounding factors. This
section presents the method, explains how we dene analysis time, how we construct the
main explanatory variables, which controls we include, and in which ways we deal with
other potential problems.
The hazard model
Duration analysis or hazard models are a statistical technique mainly developed to ana-
lyze the determinants of the duration that it takes for a particular event to occur. Just
as in any regression analysis, this is done by exploiting the variation in duration and
dierences along other observable dimensions (that is, covariates) across a larger number
of subjects. The heart of hazard analysis is the hazard function h(t) which describes the
hazard of `failing'|which in our context means quite the opposite, namely succeeding
to become a senior government ocial|at time t conditional on having survived until
t. h(t) can vary between zero and one. A possible interpretation of it is the number of
failures one would expect to observe among some population during a certain interval
at a given point in time. For our purposes, such interpretations are not essential as we
are more interested in how other events|especially having changed organization in the
last ten years|aect the instantaneous rate of failure h(t).
An individual's hazard can be written in a form that appears (and to some extent is)
quite similar to more commonly known statistical models:
hi(t) = g
 





where g is some function, h0(t) is the so called baseline hazard that is assumed to be
the same for every individual,15 0 is a constant, and Xi is the covariate matrix and X
its vector of coecients to be estimated. Here we employ the perhaps most commonly
used form of duration models: namely the semi-parametric Cox model, which has the
neat property of not imposing any functional form on the baseline hazard. At the same
time though, it is a proportional hazard model meaning that the covariates in X are
parametrized so that they multiplicatively `shift' the baseline hazard. The general Cox
15 We conduct robustness checks by relaxing this assumption through stratication.
16model's formulation is
h(t j Xi) = h0(t) exp(X
0
iX);
with h0(t) remaining parametrically unspecied and unestimated.16 This has the eect
that over time the baseline hazard can take any (including non-monotonous) form.
We now turn to discussing the crucial issue of analysis time as well as providing details
on the explanatory and control variables that form the matrix X.
Time in the analysis
In hazard analysis the denition of the start of the risk period is crucial. This is,
however, hardly straightforward with the left-truncated data that we have. For our
purpose the start of the risk period could either be dened as entry into government
employment or as entry into professional life more generally. We have to estimate one of
these events because we do not have precise data on either event. Estimating entry into
professional life can easily be done using the information on schooling, education, other
formative periods, and year of birth. Checking for the number of individuals for which the
estimated entry into professional life lies after actual entry into civil service employment
reveals that there are only 33 such cases. We deem those an acceptable inaccuracy,
especially in the light of part-time education and job entry potentially overlapping.
Main explanatory variables
As stated earlier, the main focus lies on how a number of variables that contain informa-
tion on the past career of an individual aect the likelihood of becoming a senior ocial.
The analysis focusses on two specic types of job-mobility: changes between organiza-
tions that are all part of the government administration (intra-governmental mobility
or `department hopping'), and changes from an organization outside the administration
into an administrative one (`revolving doors').
Each aspect is captured by a set of lagged variables and a cumulative measure, which
sums up the past incidents of interest over a ten-year moving window. Thus, intra-
governmental job mobility is captured by the variables Intra-Governmental Changes t-x,y
(where x and y stand for period lags) and Cumulative Intra-Governmental Changes. The
former is a dummy indicating at a given time whether the subject changed organization
either x or y periods ago, or both. (Note that always two periods are bundled together
only to reduce the number of variables to deal with.) Cumulative Intra-Governmental
16 For a more comprehensive presentation of the Cox model see for example Cameron and Trivedi (2005:
592 .).





meaning that it cumulatively sums over the number of times an individual has changed
organization in the past ten years. The higher it is, the less of a single-ministry career
someone has had.
The way in which these organizational change variables are constructed from changes
in individuals' employer codes deserves a short explanation. The data contains an orga-
nization and an establishment code for every individual in each period. Unfortunately,
neither changes in the code of establishment (which is a physical address) nor changes
in the code of the organization (which is an organizational unit) fully capture the event
of interest, namely the incident of someone actually working for a new ministry, agency,
or other kind of body. The establishment code can change quite arbitrarily, specically
when two out of the following three things change: address, name of associated orga-
nization, and industry code. A change in the organizational code may simply be due
to the establishment in which an individual works being re-organized during a merger
or split-up of ministries. An actual intra-governmental organization change in year t as
captured by the variable is therefore recorded if in t an individual has organizational and
establishment codes that are both dierent from those in t 1, but which still belong to
the government administration.
The second set of career variables are changes between the government and other
sectors. Here the focus is on incidents of changing from the private into the public
sector as well as from other non-administrative sectors into government administration;
i.e. any kind of mobility that is not intra-governmental is captured. One could capture
these two types of mobility in separate variables, but since the number of incidents is
quite low and both are forms of external mobility, we treat them jointly. The variables
recording these incidents are named Revolve t-x,y and Cumulative Revolve and both are
constructed analogously to those on intra-governmental changes.
Both types of lagged mobility variables are included with lags x and y taking the value
pairs 1,2; 3,4; 5,6; 7,8; 9,10. The cumulative variables are included on their own as they
summarize the same ten-year moving window in a single variable.
The theoretical predictions suggest that each of these variables should be statistically
signicant, with the hazard ratio magnitude indicating whether the respective career
move is conducive or detrimental to rising high in rank. Hazard ratios above one on
both, the intra-governmental change as well as the revolve covariates are expected.
18Other control variables
All the regressions control for a number of individual characteristics, such as gender,
immigrational background, and dummies for the highest educational level achieved as
well as in which subject area this was. They also take account of whether people are
working full time or part time. This is of special importance in the Swedish context
because fairly generous part-time entitlements after parenthood are widely used. Share
Full Time is therefore included in all regressions, a variable that captures the average
share of full-time that an individual worked during times of employment (again in a
moving window of the previous ten years). In every specication the dierent ages of
the subjects are controlled for by either an age variable or by letting the baseline hazard
of the Cox model vary for each birth year cohort.17
As was revealed by the descriptive statistics presented above, there is variation in peo-
ple's career patterns that is not mobility related. For example, individuals dier in terms
of whether (and for how long) they work in middle management, or in administration
more generally. While it is impossible to take account of all of these aspects, two basic
ones are controlled for in selected specications: the cumulative number of years that
someone has worked in government administration (Years in Administration), and the
cumulative number of years that someone has already been a mid-level manager (Years
in Middle Management).
The decentralized nature of recruitment to the Swedish civil service gives rise to the
concern that career success is also determined by the department in which someone
starts and later on spends his or her career. As in most countries, also in Sweden
there is a `hierarchy of prestige' among ministries, that one would expect positive career
eects from having started the career in one of the `elite' departments. In contrast,
working in these departments at later career stages may have a positive or negative
eect|competition for promotion may be tougher, for example. In any case, controlling
for the initially recruiting department, and later the employing department would be
desirable. Unfortunately, the left-truncation of the data makes it impossible to clearly
identify people's initial employing bureau. A blanket-style solution would be to include
a dummy for every organization in the dataset, but this would overwhelm even the
power of this dataset. More feasible is to control for eects that are specic to the
various SNI/NACE-indexed subsectors of the Swedish administration. And since there
17 This technique is referred to as stratication in duration analysis. It is unrelated to sample strati-
cation as commonly known. It is more exible than including a dummy for each `stratum' in that it
not only allows the baseline hazard h0(t) be shifted multiplicatively but it can take any form for each
stratum. Stratication is also computationally more ecient than dummies, which is not irrelevant
when using such a large dataset.
19are separate codes for scal administration and foreign services, among many others, it
should capture the most important variation. Below this is implemented using industry
code strata, for the same reasons as birth year strata were used earlier. The downside
is that complete industry codes are unavailable for periods during which individuals
work outside the administration. The number of observations that enter the estimation
is therefore lower in these columns and the results have to be interpreted with some
caution|these data are obviously not missing randomly.
Another concern is that aggregate shocks, such as economic up or downturns, aect
the results|and due to the nature of the method this would `hit' dierent individuals
at dierent points of analysis time. Observation year dummies, which allow to shift the
overall hazard over the years are a good way to deal with this, and they are included in
some specications.
Unfortunately, a number of things one would like to control for cannot be included be-
cause data is simply not available. The most obvious is some measure capturing innate
ability more directly than formal education. Secondly, more information on people's
careers before entering the study would be desirable. Due to the number of years that
typically lie between starting a career in government and reaching higher oce, for the
majority of individuals both events do not lie within the study period despite the ex-
ceptionally long sample. Cohorts were therefore chosen so that the incident of becoming
senior ocial occurs with sucient frequency between 1995 and 2008. This comes at
the expense of not knowing much about the start of most people's professional lives.
Discrete-time duration models
Our data are recorded annually; i.e. time is discrete rather than continuous. Together
with the extensive use of time-varying covariates, while in principle being compatible
with the Cox procedure, this may call discrete-time duration techniques on stage (see
e.g. Box-Steensmeier and Jones 2004). Earlier versions of this paper therefore con-
tained additional tables that replicated the key ndings using logit models with the data
in person-period format and dummies for the years of analysis time, which is the rec-
ommended method to cross-check Cox estimations on discrete-time data (Jenkins 1995).
Since the results were robust, brevity is given priority and the logit results are instead
available on demand.
20Table 3: Intra-governmental changes and career success (Cox)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intra-Gov Changes t   1;2 2.746*** 2.763*** 1.167 2.666***
(0.533) (0.532) (0.236) (0.529)
Intra-Gov Changes t   3;4 2.351*** 2.416*** 1.420* 2.158***
(0.467) (0.476) (0.285) (0.436)
Intra-Gov Changes t   5;6 1.492* 1.528** 1.030 1.447*
(0.319) (0.324) (0.224) (0.311)
Intra-Gov Changes t   7;8 2.140*** 2.202*** 1.660** 2.348***
(0.426) (0.437) (0.345) (0.474)
Intra-Gov Changes t   9;10 1.172 1.201 1.339 1.120
(0.248) (0.254) (0.297) (0.242)
Cumulative Intra-Gov Changes 1.804*** 1.808***
(0.103) (0.113)
Years in Administration 0.896*** 0.891***
(0.0195) (0.0194)
Years in Middle Management 1.484*** 1.483***
(0.0271) (0.0270)
Share Full Time 1.022*** 1.022*** 1.003 1.020*** 1.022*** 1.020***
(0.00786) (0.00785) (0.00821) (0.00697) (0.00790) (0.00695)
Immigrant 0.965 0.905 1.217 1.063 0.938 1.018
(0.225) (0.211) (0.296) (0.250) (0.220) (0.240)
Male 1.402*** 1.364** 1.764*** 1.081 1.390*** 1.080
(0.172) (0.168) (0.226) (0.135) (0.171) (0.135)
Edu Short Tertiary 3.160** 1.903 3.092** 2.388* 3.265** 2.427*
(1.650) (1.013) (1.639) (1.251) (1.705) (1.271)
Edu Long Tertiary or Higher 15.93*** 4.107*** 11.40*** 9.733*** 16.29*** 9.716***
(5.857) (1.830) (4.286) (3.612) (5.980) (3.605)
Education Field Dms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation Year Dms Yes
Birth Year / Age Strata Age Strata Strata Strata Strata
Orga SNI Codes Strata
Observations 576,878 576,878 304,556 576,878 576,878 576,878
Subjects 44,444 44,444 44,444 44,444 44,444 44,444
Failures 325 325 325 325 325 325
Signicance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
21Table 4: Revolving doors and career success (Cox)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Revolve t   1;2 2.157*** 2.223*** 1.481** 2.584***
(0.313) (0.322) (0.238) (0.383)
Revolve t   3;4 1.593*** 1.698*** 1.128 1.794***
(0.230) (0.243) (0.174) (0.268)
Revolve t   5;6 1.840*** 1.714*** 1.251 2.026***
(0.249) (0.232) (0.183) (0.288)
Revolve t   7;8 2.193*** 2.145*** 1.750*** 2.347***
(0.274) (0.268) (0.239) (0.301)
Revolve t   9;10 1.037 1.020 0.885 1.056
(0.163) (0.159) (0.146) (0.167)
Cumulative Revolve 2.022*** 2.252***
(0.129) (0.151)
Years in Administration 0.973 0.972
(0.0235) (0.0233)
Years in Middle Management 1.502*** 1.513***
(0.0280) (0.0286)
Share Full Time 1.026*** 1.026*** 1.004 1.018** 1.027*** 1.018**
(0.00859) (0.00858) (0.00849) (0.00813) (0.00888) (0.00843)
Immigrant 0.934 0.888 1.178 1.101 0.933 1.075
(0.218) (0.207) (0.287) (0.259) (0.218) (0.253)
Male 1.484*** 1.437*** 1.783*** 1.174 1.521*** 1.201
(0.185) (0.179) (0.229) (0.150) (0.190) (0.155)
Edu Short Tertiary 3.018** 2.033 2.998** 2.480* 2.906** 2.384*
(1.576) (1.082) (1.588) (1.298) (1.517) (1.248)
Edu Long Tertiary or Higher 16.12*** 5.160*** 11.23*** 10.48*** 14.93*** 9.459***
(5.934) (2.290) (4.212) (3.897) (5.491) (3.517)
Education Field Dms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation Year Dms Yes
Birth Year / Age Strata Age Strata Strata Strata Strata
Orga SNI Codes Strata
Observations 576,878 576,878 304,556 576,878 576,878 576,878
Subjects 44,444 44,444 44,444 44,444 44,444 44,444
Failures 325 325 325 325 325 325
Signicance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
22Table 5: Jointly estimated cumulative eects (Cox)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative Intra-Gov Changes 1.908*** 1.908*** 1.378*** 1.847***
(0.109) (0.105) (0.0935) (0.117)
Cumulative Revolve 2.104*** 2.087*** 1.609*** 2.266***
(0.134) (0.132) (0.116) (0.151)
Years in Administration 0.935***
(0.0232)
Years in Middle Management 1.514***
(0.0291)
Share Full Time 1.024*** 1.024*** 1.005 1.017**
(0.00890) (0.00885) (0.00866) (0.00817)
Immigrant 0.935 0.888 1.122 0.997
(0.220) (0.207) (0.277) (0.236)
Male 1.512*** 1.463*** 1.821*** 1.172
(0.189) (0.182) (0.234) (0.150)
Edu Short Tertiary 2.927** 1.870 2.983** 2.307
(1.528) (0.996) (1.581) (1.208)
Edu Long Tertiary or Higher 14.08*** 4.196*** 10.21*** 8.662***
(5.183) (1.871) (3.830) (3.224)
Education Field Dms Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation Year Dms Yes
Birth Year / Age Strata Age Strata Strata
Orga SNI Codes Strata
Observations 576,878 576,878 304,556 576,878
Subjects 44,444 44,444 44,444 44,444
Failures 325 325 325 325
Signicance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
234.2. Main results of Cox estimates
This section presents the results of the duration analyses in various specications. Ta-
bles 3 and 4 contain results from models estimating the eects of intra-governmental
changes, and changes between the administrative and other sectors, respectively. In
columns (1) to (4) in each table the main variables of interest are the ve lagged mobil-
ity variables. In columns (5) and (6) our focus lies on the single cumulative in the row
just below. The reported estimates are hazard ratios (exponentiated coecients), which
makes their interpretation straightforward. For example, in Table 3 the 2.14 reported for
Intra-Governmental Change t-7,8 in column (1) indicates that someone having changed
organization seven or eight years ago is today more than twice as likely to become an
SGO compared to someone who has not had this change. Values below one indicate a
decreased hazard. For example, in the same table the signicant coecients for Years in
Administration in column (4) and (6) suggest that, everything else equal, an additional
year worked in the administration in the last ten years lowers one's chance to become
an SGO by just over 10%. For all hazard ratios it must be noted that they are point
estimates and calculated for all variables at the sample mean.
Focussing only on columns (1) to (4) in Tables 3 and 4, it is easily seen that the
large majority of the hazard ratios of interest are well above one and highly signicant.
The main exceptions are those indicating the eect of mobility 9 and 10 periods ago,
and a few other coecients in columns (3). This suggests that the relationship becomes
weaker over time. The lower signicance levels in columns (3) are no reason to be overly
alarmed because this is the specication stratied by SNI-codes and the resulting drop
in used observations (ca 300,000 instead of over 575,000). Columns (2) and (4) dier in
that the former has observation year dummies and an age variable included (instead of
birth year strata), and the latter replicates specication (1) but with controls for years
in administration and middle management included. All estimates are very robust to
these variants. All in all, the results suggest that department hopping and doing a round
in the revolving doors is indeed positively associated with becoming an SGO during the
years of the study.
The hazard ratios of the control variables reveal some corollary ndings: As one
would expect, a higher average share of full-time work performed in the last ten years is
positively related to chances of success. Specically, a one percentage point increase in
share of full-time is associated with an enhanced chance of becoming an SGO by roughly
2% (except in column 3).18 The cumulative years of middle management experience
18 This `eect' may well work through a low-ambition signalling mechanism.
24also exhibits a positive relationship in all specications and both tables. While not very
surprising, the link between how middle management and how top management positions
are reached should receive further attention in future research based on this data. The
general administrative experience seems to be negatively correlated with later success
(although the estimates are insignicant in Table 4). This may reect the earlier nding
from the descriptive statistics whereby future SGOs seemed to have faster careers. The
fact that no unambiguous eects of immigrational background can be found may surprise
some, but the lack of statistical signicance most likely stems from the low number of
cases. Finally, the hazard ratio on gender is above one, in line with the descriptive
evidence presented above.
The nal two columns in each table have the ve lagged career variables replaced by
the single cumulative one. Clearly, the positive associations of the cumulative indicators
in Tables 3 and 4 reect the overall ndings from columns (1) to (4). This is important
because the cumulative variables are then used to estimate both eects jointly in Table
5. As can be seen there, the main ndings are conrmed even when the cumulative
intra-government and revolve variables are included jointly.19 The coecients of the
rst two variables are above one and highly signicant throughout. This seems to be
stable across various model specications including the industry strata in column (3).
Corollary results such as the positive association of middle management experience and
the slight negative eect of time spent working in administration also hold up. All in
all, the joint estimations using the cumulative variables conrm all previous ndings.
4.3. Results based on pure entrant sample
So far all results were based on a vast amount of observations, but there was a price
to pay for using so much information. For a large share of individuals in the sample
the start of their government career remained eclipsed|the data is left-truncated. This
section presents a robustness check to rule out the possibility that the results are inu-
enced this problem. The strategy is simply to replicate the ndings with a much more
selective|and thus more homogeneous|sample than the one used so far. To do this,
rst a subsample of pure entrants into the civil service is drawn. Using the classication
for non-truncation from above (recall that spells are non-truncated if there is no govern-
ment employment in 1985, 86, and 87), only such individuals are retained. Second, the
additional requirement is imposed that the estimated entry into professional life must
lie less than seven years before entry into the civil service. This is to keep out very
19 The joint results are reported only with the cumulative career history variables mainly for ease of
presentation. Including both sets of lagged variables yields analogous results.
25experienced hires. The new sample is substantially smaller, now only containing 6,335
individuals who|by denition|are at earlier stages in their careers and therefore are
expected to have lower transition rates into higher oces. Only 30 of them are observed
to `fail'. A clear sign that the sample is more homogenous is the fact that now the
maximum age upon entry into the administration is only 32 while it was 64 previously
(refer back to Table 1).
Table 6: Lagged mobility incidents before becoming SGO (pure entrants vs full sample)
(gures in percent) Lags 1,2 Lags 3,4 Lags 5,6 Lags 7,8 Lags 9,10
Intra-Governm. Mobility
Intra-Gov Change (Entrants) 16.67 20.00 13.33 13.33 10.00
Intra-Gov Change (All) 10.15 9.85 8.00 9.23 8.00
Mobility from Other Sectors
Revolve (Entrants) 33.33 40.00 30.00 43.33 23.33
Revolve (All) 19.69 20.92 24.92 31.69 15.69
A rst glance at the data suggests left-truncation is of minor importance for our main
conclusions. Table 6 displays the main lagged career variables for all SGOs in the ten
periods prior to attaining SGO-status. It can be seen that the share of individuals for
which these dummy variables take the value one (i.e. they changed x or y periods ago)
is higher in the pure entrant sample throughout. Thus, the eects found above may
turn out to be even stronger in the entrant sample. However, as a comparison of the two
samples along the career variables and previous-period positions shows, the two samples
also dier in many other ways (see Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix) and we therefore
re-run the key specications on the restricted sample. The results are reported in Tables
11 and 12 in the Appendix; the structure of the tables is the same as of those discussed
above.20 They reveal that some of the previous results are less precisely estimated, but
none vanish . Specically, in Table 11 of the individually lagged intra-governmental
mobility variables all bare one (lag 5,6 in column 4) retain a value above one, and in
Table 12 it is all of them up to lag 7,8. The smaller sample size slashes signicance
levels, however, with now only just under half of the individually lagged hazard ratios
20 The results of estimating the two eects jointly using the cumulative variables are available on request.
They bear no surprises.
26reaching a conventional level of precision. But this appears to be mainly due to larger
standard errors and not due to smaller point estimates. Notably, all the results hold
up when the cumulative variables are used, and the same is true when the eects are
estimated jointly (results not reported). All in all this can be viewed as a conrmation of
the previous results because the restrictions imposed to create the entrant sample were
very strict.
Previous versions of the paper also contained the estimates based on the entrant sample
using discrete-time logit models. The results all hold up with only some dropping by
one signicance level, and the magnitudes of the estimated hazard ratios are very close
to the Cox estimates presented here.
5. Identifying the mechanism: skill acquisition or signalling
Table 7: Shares of employees by mobility incidents and education level (all and later
SGOs)
(in percent except totals) Upper Short Long Postgrad
Secondary Tertiary Tertiary or PhD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All
Number of Individuals 20,820 3,101 19,390 1,133
Zero mobility 96.00 93.94 90.95 94.44
One mobility incident 3.48 4.90 6.89 4.32
Two mobility incidents 0.47 1.03 1.72 0.97
Three or more 0.06 0.13 0.44 0.26
Later SGOs
Number of Individuals 16 7 261 41
Zero mobility 43.75 85.71 58.24 73.17
One mobility incident 43.75 14.29 25.29 17.07
Two mobility incidents 12.50 0.00 14.18 7.32
Three or more 0.00 0.00 2.30 2.44
The results of the foregoing section provide good evidence for the hypothesis that
career patterns of an individual dating back up to ten years have relevant predictive
power for his or her chances of becoming very successful in the Swedish government
hierarchy. The natural question to ask now is `why?'. Why are intra-governmental
27Table 8: The mobility-success link: HCR or signalling (Cox)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative Intra-Gov Changes 2.847*** 3.077*** 2.253*** 3.289***
(0.724) (0.701) (0.659) (0.815)
Cum Intra-Gov Changes  Higher Edu 0.626* 0.582** 0.561* 0.539**
(0.163) (0.137) (0.168) (0.137)
Years in Administration 0.890***
(0.0194)
Years in Middle Management 1.485***
(0.0271)
Share Full Time 1.022*** 1.022*** 1.003 1.020***
(0.00790) (0.00787) (0.00827) (0.00695)
Immigrant 0.938 0.878 1.183 1.020
(0.220) (0.205) (0.288) (0.240)
Male 1.391*** 1.352** 1.774*** 1.082
(0.171) (0.166) (0.227) (0.135)
Edu Short Tertiary 4.993*** 2.904* 4.685*** 3.661**
(2.854) (1.670) (2.711) (2.087)
Edu Long Tertiary or Higher 21.17*** 5.436*** 14.83*** 13.19***
(8.796) (2.606) (6.190) (5.472)
Education Field Dms Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation Year Dms Yes
Birth Year / Age Strata Age Strata Strata
Orga SNI Codes Strata
Observations 576,878 576,878 304,556 576,878
Subjects 44,444 44,444 44,444 44,444
Failures 325 325 325 325
Signicance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
28job mobility but also other organization changes associated with future career success?
Which mechanism(s) might drive these results? As discussed earlier, the two main
rivalling theories within personnel economics are a) human capital acquisition, whereby
holding a number of dierent posts in various departments or the private sector has
a positive experience and learning eect, and b) some form of ability signalling where
departmental mobility may signal the ability and career commitment of an employee to
his or her superiors and other decision makers in the internal labour market, who are
then more apt to promote him or her.21
Some clues how to empirically dierentiate between the two channels can be found
in the existing literature. Building on an idea by Waldman (1984), Bernhard (1995)
presents a model of intra-rm promotions where employee talent is initially unknown
but revealed over time. Importantly, ability is revealed only to the current employer
while other rms in the economy do not receive these signals. What everyone observes,
however, is if an individual is promoted in any other rm. Bernhardt identies two
eects in this setting: First, despite it being optimal to assign able employees to higher-
level jobs, rms may nd it optimal to under-promote employees in order to hide their
ability from the outside market. Second, at the same time it is optimal to fast track (i.e.
over-promote) the better employees who have already been promoted once because their
talent is revealed in any case, and further promotions are needed to prevent them from
leaving. Building on this argument, DeVaro and Waldman (2007) show that signalling-
based fast track eects should be weaker for individuals with higher education because
education is a valid ability signal that is observable to everyone. Specically, they show
that the wage premium associated with promotions should be lower for more educated
employees, and they provide some empirical support for this hypothesis. A related test
is conducted by Belzil and Bognanno (2004) who nd that the (small) fast track eects
they identify for executives of 380 US rms are less pronounced for employees with higher
education and longer rm tenure. They write \the magnitude of the individual specic
eect of achieving a higher speed of promotion is inversely related to accumulated human
capital; [...] these ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that the signaling aspect
of past promotions is stronger for those who are relatively new in a rm" (8).
Inspired by these approaches, we conduct a test based on a similar argument, which
is applicable to the particular context of this paper where the link of interest is between
past mobility and promotion. First note that the incidents of mobility (that we observe)
are dierent in nature from past promotions (which the other papers focus on) in that
21 A third possibility are of course networks, which arguably expand with increased mobility and enhance
career chances, but for reasons of scope the paper cannot deal with this channel in greater detail.
29employees have much more inuence over changing between jobs and organizations than
over their own promotions. It is therefore appropriate to interpret past mobility as
an often voluntary `career move' by the employee|at least much more so than his or
her past promotion speed.22 Now, suppose that formal and thus observable education
is (at least imperfectly) a valid signal for ability, and suppose also that it is (at least
imperfectly) an indicator of the ability of an individual to acquire human capital.23
Then if observable career moves such as `departmental hopping' only have a signalling
eect but no human capital accumulation eect, better educated employees have less
of an incentive to be mobile relative to less educated employees. This is assuming
that the two ability signals are at least partial substitutes for each other. In turn, if
inter-organizational mobility primarily has an human capital accumulation eect but
no signalling eect, and supposing that observable education proxies for the ability to
acquire human capital on various posts, then highly educated employees have a higher
incentive to undertake career moves than less educated employees (because the return
on changing jobs is greater).
A related argument could also be made from the employer's point of view, which is
again more in line with the reasoning of DeVaro and Waldman: If department hopping
is a credible (because costly) signal of ability and career commitment that an employee
can send to her employer, then employers may respond more strongly to such signals
from less educated employees because they carry more additional information.
In any case, both arguments generate the following testable prediction: The coe-
cients of the interaction terms between the mobility variables and the dummies for higher
education should point in the opposite direction than the non-interacted mobility vari-
able. More concretely, since mobility and success are positively associated, one would
expect the hazard ratio of mobility interacted with high education to be below one. To
test this hypothesis, the cumulative intra-governmental mobility variable as well as the
complete set of lagged mobility variables are interacted with a dummy for any higher
university degree.24 Then the key regressions are re-run.
But before turning to those results, a rst glace at mobility incidents and educational
attainment is worthwhile. For each educational level, Table 7 shows the shares of indi-
22 Changes due to organizations ceasing to exist are extremely rare in our data, which is unfortunate
for various other interesting research designs.
23 A standard assumption in many seminal models, such as Spence (1973).
24 Note that there are theoretical reasons why we only carry out these tests with the intra-administrative
mobility variable: The transferability of human capital gained in the private sector to the government
sector is less clear than within the administration. Similarly, the signal content of an incident of
external mobility is likely to be much less clear; for example, well-educated workers who move from
the private to the public sector may seek a quieter life.
30viduals that have had zero, one, two, or `three plus' mobility incidents over the previous
ten years (always as a percentage of all individuals with the respective educational level).
The bottom part of the table shows the same information only for those who later be-
come SGOs. The main insight from Table 7 is that the shares of employees with more
mobility incidents tends to be higher among the better educated. And the shares become
even higher if one only looks at those who later become SGOs. For example, while less
than half a percent of all those with long tertiary or postgraduate education had two,
three or more mobility incidents, it is nearly 2.5% among the later SGOs. So a priori a
lot suggests that mobility, education, and later career success all go hand in hand. The
following multivariate duration models allow to draw a more dierentiated picture.
Table 8 shows the Cox model specications in which the cumulative mobility variables
are interacted with the higher education dummies, in addition to all variables that were
included above (some not reported). The second line in Table 8 speaks a fairly clear
language. In all specications the coecient on past incidents of mobility interacted with
the highest educational levels is below one and statistically signicant, suggesting that
the link between mobility and future career success is signicantly weaker for individuals
with higher education. We have also veried that the results hold for a model where each
independent lagged mobility variable is interacted with the high education dummy. The
estimates are consistently less than one, and the dummies down to t   4 are signicant
in all our main specications (results available on request).
Our results thus show that mobility is a better predictor of future success for the less
educated. Although this is far from ironclad proof in favor of the signalling hypothe-
sis, our interpretation|based on the assumption of signal substitutability|is that it is
indicative of signalling as an important driver of the positive eects found in the main
analysis. An alternative explanation would be that more educated people have more spe-
cialist careers and therefore, once committed to a department or subject area, advance
quickest by staying and acquiring skill within the organization dealing with the issues re-
lated to their expertise, whereas less educated workers may benet more from on-the-job
learning and therefore nd it worthwhile to move around. We have tried to analyze this
hypothesis using coarse indicators for the degree of educational specialization but could
not nd any evidence of such eects; it should be acknowledged, though, that the data
are far from ideal for this exercise. One other possibility we cannot rule out completely
is that there are interactions between the organizations' (informal) hierarchy of pres-
tige and their recruitment. For example, highly educated workers may be able to enter
`fast track' organizations earlier in their career. The fact that the interaction between
mobility and education is insensitive to the use of SNI-code strata (column 3), which
31control for variation along several subcategories within the government administration,
does speak against this hypothesis to some degree.
6. Conclusion
This paper studies job mobility in the Swedish government administration in the last
two decades. Based on a statistical analysis of data capturing 24 years of the career
progression of around 44,000 Swedish civil servants, we nd that Swedish government
is best characterized as a permeable internal labour market. Around 75% of all mid-
dle and 80% of top managers are being recruited from within the core administration
of government, and 70% come from within the very same organization where they are
(rst) appointed middle or top-manager. But recruitment from and interchange with
other sectors is clearly present, too. Interestingly, interchange with the actual (com-
mercial) private sector is of least importance: Only 2.5% of middle and 1.23% of senior
ocials work in the private sector immediately before attaining the respective level for
the rst time. In Sweden a `revolving doors' instead mainly seems to exist between the
administration and sectors such as interest groups, NGOs, local government, and public
organizations that are not part of the core administration.
The second part of the paper links mobility-related characteristics in civil servants'
past careers to future success. Cox models are used to explain the incident of an individ-
ual rst reaching the status of a senior government ocial (SGO)|which only around
0.7% of all civil servants in our sample reach|while controlling for a wide range of
confounding factors. The results reveal that intra-administrative job mobility and inter-
changes between other sectors and the administration are positively associated with the
chances of later becoming an SGO.
The results are consistent with labour economics theories suggesting that changes
of organization either help individuals to gain experience and skills that qualify them
for future leadership functions (human capital acquisition), and/or let them send a
credible (because costly) signal of ability and career commitment to decision makers at
the internal labour markets. Both mechanisms can imply higher promotion chances and
thus higher overall success rates. In an attempt to discriminate between the two channels
we document that that the positive eects of mobility are larger for civil servants with
less formal education, which is consistent with a signalling interpretation if the signals
of education and mobility are partially substitutable, as has been argued in the existing
literature.
Our ndings of a positive relationship between incidents of job mobility and career
32success, and the evidence suggesting that an informational signalling mechanism rather
than human capital acquisition may drive the results, raises concerns that leadership
selection and career incentives in government-internal labour markets may create distor-
tionary incentives for younger employees. If young and eager administrators implicitly
or explicitly understand that `department hopping' gets them up the hierarchical ladder,
they have an incentive to do so irrespective of whether this helps the organization as a
whole or even whether they advance the skills they need. In the worst case changing
jobs too often becomes an individually career optimizing but overall harmful activity, as
suggested by Br osamle (2010). Although our analysis points in this direction, it should
be acknowledged that we cannot establish the existence of such distortions as a hard fact,
among other reasons because our data does not include individual's performance ratings
and because we are unable to disentangle to what extent mobility patterns are due to
choice versus constraint. The results do however suggest that implicit incentive struc-
tures and career concerns may be as important for the mobility choices of civil servants
as it has been found to be for employees in private sector companies|a feature which
is well-documented in the personnel economics literature on internal labor markets.
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A. Appendix with additional statistical tables
36Table 9: Career characteristics at dierent career stages: entrant sample versus initial sample, cumulative over 10 previous
years, by later success
Stats for Individuals entering 1st Gov Employment 1st Middle Mmnt Position (ssyk1) SGO (ssyk111)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Later Later All Later Later All
Individuals SGO no SGO Individuals SGO no SGO Individuals
Entrant Sample
Time Worked in Dierent Sectors
Years Worked in Administration 1.00
y 1.00
y 1.00
y 8.01 6.80 8.17 7.13
Years Worked in Private Sector 1.07 2.25 1.07 0.38 0.47 0.37 0.43
z
Years Worked in Capital 1.55 2.75 1.55 4.83 8.47 4.36 8.63
Years Worked in Other Employment 0.68 1.75 0.68 1.00 1.70 0.91 1.60
z





Time Worked in Dierent Sectors
Years Worked in Administration 1.00
y 1.00
y 1.00
y 8.58 6.76 8.80 7.62
Years Worked in Private Sector 2.19 1.14 2.20 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.28
Years Worked in Capital 2.56 5.24 2.54 4.74 8.13 4.35 7.50
Years Worked in Other Employment 2.71 5.95 2.68 1.14 2.21 1.01 1.80







y) Figures are measured end of period, thus they are all one.
z) Figures may well be lower than those two columns to the left because of 10 year moving window.
x) These very low shares arise from those few entrants who start as a middle managers right away.
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7Table 10: Positions before entering dierent career stages: entrant sample versus initial full sample, by later success
Stats for Individuals entering 1st Gov Employment 1st Middle Mmnt Position (ssyk1) SGO (ssyk111)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Later Later All Later Later All
Individuals SGO no SGO Individuals SGO no SGO Individuals
Entrant Sample
Sector in Previous Period (shares)
Worked in Administration n/a n/a n/a 77.99 73.33 78.57 83.33
Worked in Private Sector 15.75 10.00 15.78 1.87 3.33 1.68 n/a
Worked in Capital 21.82 60.00 21.64 48.88 90.00 43.70 93.33
Worked in Other Sector 19.16 53.33 19.00 12.31 10.00 12.61 10.00
Worked in Middle Management n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 16.67
Mobility Incident Previous Period (shrs)
Revolved into current Position 100.00 100.00 100.00 22.01 26.67 21.43 16.67
Intra-Gov Change into cur Pos n/a n/a n/a 5.60 6.67 5.46 3.33
Changed Orga into cur Position 74.05 93.33 73.95 15.67 20.00 15.13 10.00
Initial Full Sample
Sector in Previous Period (shares)
Worked in Administration n/a n/a n/a 73.55 59.54 75.01 80.00
Worked in Private Sector 14.16 5.96 14.24 2.52 1.97 2.57 1.23
Worked in Capital 13.27 41.23 13.06 37.98 66.77 35.02 73.85
Worked in Other Sector 20.07 44.92 19.89 13.81 15.38 13.65 5.23
Worked in Middle Management n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 32.92
Mobility Incident Previous Period (shrs)
Revolved into current Position 51.30 67.08 51.18 24.39 37.85 23.01 20.00
Intra-Gov Change into current Position n/a n/a n/a 5.82 10.46 5.34 9.23
Changed Orga into current Position 33.92 43.38 33.85 17.34 30.15 16.02 18.77
3
8Table 11: Intra-governmental changes and career success: entrant sample only (Cox)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intra-Gov Changes t   1;2 2.932** 2.683* 1.030 3.426**
(1.602) (1.443) (0.566) (2.083)
Intra-Gov Changes t   3;4 3.810** 3.536** 2.446 2.374
(1.987) (1.816) (1.335) (1.425)
Intra-Gov Changes t   5;6 1.301 1.783 1.299 0.679
(0.786) (1.019) (0.907) (0.505)
Intra-Gov Changes t   7;8 2.821* 2.676* 2.301 1.310
(1.623) (1.519) (1.738) (0.990)
Intra-Gov Changes t   9;10 5.451** 4.548** 3.410 1.033
(3.706) (2.999) (3.065) (1.073)
Cumulative Intra-Gov Changes 2.191*** 1.498**
(0.353) (0.302)
Years in Administration 0.991 1.004
(0.0886) (0.0882)
Years in Middle Management 2.951*** 2.751***
(0.503) (0.416)
Share Full Time 1.017 1.023 1.012 1.011 1.018 1.013
(0.0276) (0.0297) (0.0438) (0.0322) (0.0269) (0.0332)
Immigrant 1.197 1.416 1.566 0.973 1.120 1.104
(0.967) (1.050) (1.272) (0.846) (0.874) (0.920)
Male 2.162* 2.083* 2.575** 1.355 2.027* 1.349
(0.858) (0.819) (1.148) (0.590) (0.805) (0.593)
Edu Short Tertiary 0.655 0.231 1.368 0.578 0.650 0.614
(0.836) (0.321) (1.919) (0.764) (0.831) (0.806)
Edu Long Tertiary or Higher 2.488 0.364 3.352 2.209 2.543 2.265
(2.095) (0.497) (3.431) (1.934) (2.131) (1.980)
Education Field Dms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation Year Dms Yes
Birth Year / Age Strata Age Strata Strata Strata Strata
Orga SNI Codes Strata
Observations 83,099 83,099 33,909 83,099 83,099 83,099
Subjects 6,335 6,335 6,335 6,335 6,335 6,335
Failures 30 30 30 30 30 30
Signicance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
39Table 12: Revolving doors and career success: entrant sample (Cox)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Revolve t   1;2 3.318*** 3.646*** 2.050* 4.338***
(1.359) (1.470) (0.889) (1.915)
Revolve t   3;4 3.350*** 2.986*** 2.078 5.327***
(1.332) (1.188) (0.930) (2.343)
Revolve t   5;6 1.585 1.676 1.151 2.222
(0.734) (0.744) (0.574) (1.116)
Revolve t   7;8 1.473 1.867 1.133 1.521
(0.706) (0.827) (0.638) (0.782)
Revolve t   9;10 0.580 0.690 0.673 0.283*
(0.325) (0.347) (0.441) (0.185)
Cumulative Revolve 2.275*** 2.634***
(0.512) (0.609)
Years in Administration 1.225* 1.091
(0.138) (0.103)
Years in Middle Management 3.371*** 3.272***
(0.532) (0.506)
Share Full Time 1.027 1.031 1.031 1.020 1.030 1.019
(0.0342) (0.0353) (0.0494) (0.0465) (0.0369) (0.0440)
Immigrant 1.113 1.375 1.387 0.916 1.115 0.886
(0.936) (1.039) (1.167) (0.854) (0.898) (0.827)
Male 2.929*** 2.961*** 3.419*** 2.373* 3.099*** 2.397*
(1.205) (1.208) (1.581) (1.097) (1.287) (1.103)
Edu Short Tertiary 0.787 0.250 1.308 0.817 0.816 0.888
(1.003) (0.346) (1.770) (1.072) (1.039) (1.155)
Edu Long Tertiary or Higher 3.706 0.382 3.048 3.324 3.386 2.928
(3.119) (0.526) (2.949) (2.905) (2.846) (2.598)
Education Field Dms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation Year Dms Yes
Birth Year / Age Strata Age Strata Strata Strata Strata
Orga SNI Codes Strata
Observations 83,099 83,099 33,909 83,099 83,099 83,099
Subjects 6,335 6,335 6,335 6,335 6,335 6,335
Failures 30 30 30 30 30 30
Signicance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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